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Eleven states have enacted such statutes making collective negotiations
mandatory upon employers of public school teachers. 51 Florida is now in a
position to follow the lead of these other states and to enact some meaningful,
effective legislation in the public employee area.
GARY

M.

KETCHUM

FLORIDA ELECTIONS: LEGISLATIVE INTENT QUESTIONED IN
PURPORTED REGULATION OF CORRUPT PRACTICES
Maloney v. Kirk, 212 So. 2d 609 (1968)

Plaintiff, a qualified elector of Florida, challenged the title of Claude R.
Kirk, Jr. to the office of governor., Plaintiff charged numerous violations of
the state's Corrupt Practices Act, 2 including improper receipt, handling, and
disbursement of campaign funds in the 1966 primary and general elections,
and he contended that Governor Kirk's election should therefore be invalidated under Florida Statutes, section 104.27. 3 The circuit court dismissed
the complaint, finding that section 104.27 is an invalid legislative addition to
the constitutional qualifications of candidates for governor insofar as it purports to authorize a decree voiding the election of a constitutional officer for
violation of a statute controlling election contributions and expenditures. The
Florida supreme court affirmed per curiam, without opinion. Justice Roberts,
with Chief Justice Caldwell and Justice Adams, specially concurred, adopting
the opinion of the circuit court, which they published in full. Justice Ervin
concurred with opinion; Justice Drew, joined by Justice Thornal, dissented.
Although a majority of the justices favored dismissal of the complaint
against Governor Kirk, the ground of their affirmance is not clear. 4 No
opinion accompanied the order, but the supreme court has not thereby bound
itself to the opinion of the circuit court. The mere affirmance of the decision

51.

Deemer & Fowks, supra note 11.

1. Suit was authorized by FLA. STAT. §104.27 (9) (1967).
2. FLA. STAT. §99.161 (1967).
3. FLA. STAT. §104.27(2): "The nomination or election to office of any person who
wilfully violates the provisions of §99.161, or cause to violate, may be declared void by
the court of competent jurisdiction in which event the nomination for office shall be held
as in other cases where a vacancy occurs."
4. The attribute of a "per curiam" may imply a variety of connotations, e.g., a review
of questions of fact, questions that involve nothing more than the discretion of the trial
court, or questions that involve settled rules of law. It may be used to affirm or reverse
cases on the authority of some other case; there is "no limit to the grounds that may prompt
a per curiam opinion," Newmons v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 87 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1956).
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reached by the lower court does not technically preclude rejection, at some
future date, of the circuit court's reasoning. The court thus avoided a binding
decision on the validity of section 104.27; its action, however, has left the
statute subject to serious constitutional question.5
The Florida Constitution clearly delineates the qualifications required of
candidates for the office of governor 6 and also specifies certain general disqualifications.7 It was settled in Thomas v. States that the constitution is a
limitation of power as well as a grant of power to the legislature, and that
specific constitutional provision with reference to a subject amounts to a
prohibition of inconsistent legislative action in the same area. Thus, the
Florida Legislature is denied authority to add or detract from constitutionally
established qualifications of candidates for governor. The circuit court
claimed that forbidding a successful candidate from occupying public office
by voiding his election because of possible improper campaign contributor
influences is merely an indirect imposition of qualifications not enumerated
in the state constitution and is not regulation of election. 9
There is a fundamental difference between fixing qualifications of a
candidate for office and determining the validity of his election. The constitution does determine eligibility, but the legislature is empowered to insure
proper and valid elections, with adequate penalties for violations. 10 The
circuit court chose to place the requirements listed in section 104.27 within
the category of qualifications for office and found them incompatible with
the state constitution. The court's holding is a tenable one, but there are
several arguments that would support a decision to consider section 104.27
as an election regulation.
First of all, the statute operates against the election, not against the
candidate. Theoretically, a candidate whose title to office is voided is not
disqualified; his removal and the resulting vacancy are created by the
invalidity of the election."' As Justice Ervin's opinion points out, the statute
provides for no prejudice to the violator's future candidacy.' 2
Florida courts have dealt previously with section 104.27, although the
instant case is the first to challenge a governor's title under this provision.
s
In Evans v. Carroll,"
a district court upheld the invalidation of a lesser public
official's election for improperly reported campaign contributions. The
5. Five justices affirmed the decision of the lower court to dismiss, and, although only
three concurred specifically with the lower court's reasons for invalidating the statute, a
fourth agreed to its unconstitutionality, 212 So. 2d at 614.
6. FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §3 (1885). The new Florida Constitution adopted in November
1968, contains essentially the same qualifications in art. IV, §5.
7. FLA. CONs'r. art. VI, §5 (1885). The new constitution sets out some of these disqualifications in art. VI, §4.
8. 58 So. 2d 173, 176 (Fla. 1952).
9. 212 So. 2d at 613 (1968).
10. Id. at 623; see FLA. CONST. art. HI, §26, art. VI, §9 (1885). Ervin v. Capitol Weekly
Post, 97 So. 2d 464, 469 (Fla. 1957) discusses the court's recognition of this particular legislative power.
11. 212 So. 2d 609, 613 (1968).
12. Id. at 617 (concurring opinion).
13. 108 So. 2d 782 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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supreme court had earlier reviewed this application of section 104.27 (in
14
denying a direct appeal by Evans) and found it constitutional.
Other jurisdictions have election regulations with penalties similar to those
imposed by this statute. For example, the Wisconsin supreme court ruled, in
State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler,15 that the legislature was competent to
provide for revocation of a governor's certificate to office and for invalidation
of his election in cases of corrupt practices. The Maryland supreme court
invalidated the certification of a gubernatorial candidate and removed his
name from the ballot because of his failure to appoint a campaign manager
in accordance with that state's corrupt practices act.' 6 Among other state
courts that have dealt with this question, a significant number have similarly enforced the penalty for such violations. 7 In addition, of those states
that have invalidated statutes of this nature, some did so because the law in
question had provided for a candidate's future disqualification from holding
office.8 This sanction was not included in Florida's statute.
The circuit court sought to support its contention that the legislature
had placed additional qualifications upon candidates for governor by asserting
that the severity of the penalty imposed upon a candidate for violating the
Corrupt Practices Act is out of step with sanctions provided for in other areas
of the election code. Justice Roberts repeated the lower court's statement that
if the purpose of the statute had been purity of the ballot, the legislature
would have imposed the same penalty for bribery, intimidation of electors,
and other similar offenses that tend directly to affect the ballot rather than
render the legally elected officers subject to possible corrupt influences.19
In questioning the severity of the penalty, the circuit court assumed that
violations of the Corrupt Practices Act would influence only future actions
of elected candidates, and that improper expenditures or contributions would
not be calculated to influence voting to such an extent as to prevent the
election from being "a true expression of the popular will."'2 There is merit
in Justice Drew's charge that this assumption by the circuit court is really a
judicial negation of the exercise of the legislature's power to determine what

14. 104 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1958); see Johnson v. Harris, 188 So. 2d 888 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1966). This is the only other Florida case arising under §104.27; although its constitutionality
was not challenged specifically, the procedure outlined by the statute was not questioned by

the court.
15. 200 Wis. 518, 228 N.W. 895, 907 (1930).
16. Secretary of State v. McGucken, 244 Md. 70, 222 A.2d 693 (1966).
17. Bradley v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 196, 65 P. 395, 396 (1901) (additional oath of office was
invalidated, but legislature may revoke office for commission of enumerated corrupt practices); Dupin v. Sullivan, 355 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Ky. 1962) (election of city trustee voided);
Owen v. Brooks, 300 Ky. 743, 190 S.W.2d 326 (1945) (school board election); Hayes v.
Abney, 186 Miss. 205, 188 So. 533 (1939); Tipton v. Sands, 103 Mont. 1, 60 P.2d 662 (1936)
(supreme court chief justice's election voided).
18. State v. Regan, 113 Mont. 343, 126 P.2d 818 (1942); State v. Carrigan, 82 N.J.L. 225,
82 A. 524 (1912); Kilday v. State, 75 S.W. 2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), ag'd, 127 Tex. Crim.
113, 75 S.W.2d (1934).
19. 212 So. 2d at 614.
20. Id. at 613.
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is reasonably calculated to have an improper influence on voting. 1
The Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1951 in response to a demand
by the public that positive steps be taken to safeguard the sanctity of the
election of public officials. Indignation, in part over disclosures made before
the Kefauver Committee at Miami and Tampa in 1949 (concerning contributions by gamblers to a 1948 gubernatorial candidate), spurred the legislature
to develop more stringent laws governing campaign finances.22 The severity

of the penalty imposed under section 104.27 appears to have been calculated
to assure strict compliance by the candidates to the established financial
restrictions.
In view of the history surrounding the enactment of this legislation and
of the practice in many other states having similar provisions, the constitutional ground upon which the circuit court based its rejection of section 104.27
remains a questionable one. Arguments advanced against the court's contentions have logical consistency and some support in precedent. Since support
exists both for the statute's constitutional validity and for its invalidity, the
final decision to reject or retain it should be determined as a matter of policy
in election regulations.
Ideally, continuation of this strict policy in regard to election finances
would benefit Florida voters, for it would make more difficult the undetected
23
There are practical
entry of special interest money into Florida campaigns.
For instance,
to
the
voters.
benefit
potential
difficulties that tend to negate its
a successful suit against the governor, completed after he had occupied the
office for a substantial period, would call into question the validity of all his
official acts to that time. The length of the litigation itself would compound
this problem. Further, there is no limit to the number of independent suits
that could be brought against a successful candidate by political opponents
as well as impartial citizens. This might keep his title to office constantly in
doubt and thereby minimize the effectiveness of his administration.
If the desirability of such a law is found to outweigh the problems its
operation creates, the legislature could amend it to remove some of its
procedural difficulties and, perhaps, the constitutional objections voiced by
the opinions in this case. For example, the statute could be changed to impose
a limitation of elapsed time following an election within which action must
be brought and completed by a challenging voter. This would allow a
candidate's certificate of office to be withheld, avoiding the necessity of a
24
judicial ouster which Justice Ervin found constitutionally questionable,
and quiet a candidate's title to office from the beginning.
EDWARD L. KELLY

21. Id. at 624 (dissenting opinion). The supreme court recognized the power of the
legislature to determine what conduct constitutes improper practice or undue influence in
an election in Ex parte Hawthorne, 116 Fla. 608, 156 So. 619 (1934).
22. Roady, Ten Years of Florida's "Who Gave It -Who Got It" Law, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 434, 436 (1962).

23. Id. at 434.
24.

212 So. 2d at 617 (concurring opinion).
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